

## Message Text

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12

ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /024 W

----- 028435

P R 220800Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2702

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AFB JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 TOKYO 11748

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, JA, KS, KN, OREP (CODEL WOLFF)

SUBJ: CODEL WOLFF: TASK FORCE CALLS

REF: TOKYO 11354

SUMMARY: DURING CODEL WOLFF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE TASK FORCE CALLS, CONGRESSMEN DISCUSSED RANGE OF QUESTIONS REGARDING ASIA BUT PARTICULARLY PROBED JAPANESE AND US MILITARY INTERLOCUTERS ON PERCEPTIONS OF RELATION OF JAPAN'S SECURITY TO THAT OF THE ROK. WITH NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF SOCIALIST DIETMAN, ALL OTHERS, INCLUDING FONOFF, LDP DIETMEN, JDA OFFICIALS AND US MILITARY, DESCRIBED WITH DIFFERING NUANCES STABILITY AND PEACE ON KOREAN PENINSULA AND ROK AS IMPORTANT FOR JAPAN'S OWN SECURITY. JAPANESE, HOWEVER, SUGGESTED THAT US AND JAPAN SHOULD ACTIVELY SEEK TO HELP RESTORE DIALOGUE BETWEEN NK AND SK AND PROMOTE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. IN CONTRAST, SOCIALIST DIETMAN URGED US AND JAPAN TO RECOGNIZE NEW REALITIES IN ASIA, CEASE RESISTENCE TO INEVITABLE HISTORICAL TIDE, AND HELP PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY THROUGH POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY MEANS. LDP LEADERS REPORTED PM MIKI WAS VERY SATISFIED  
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WITH US VISIT.

ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURE TASK FORCE CALLS IN FONOFF, EPA, MITI AND AGRICULTURE MINISTRY FOCUSED ON JAPANESE ECONOMY, JAPAN'S ENERGY AND RAW MATERIAL IMPORT NEEDS, ECONOMIC PRACTICES,

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELIABILITY OF US MARKETS. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING AUGUST 11-14 VISIT TO TOKYO, CODEL WOLFF MET WITH PM MIKI, DEP PM FUKUDA, AND FONMIN MIYAZAWA (REPORTED REFTEL). DIVIDED INTO FOUR TASK FORCES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, ECONOMICS, AND AGRICULTURE, THE CONGRESSMEN CONDUCTED CONVERSATIONS WITH A HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL SPECTRUM OF JAPAN'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INTELLECTUAL, AND BUREAUCRATIC LEADERSHIP. FOLLOWING REPORTS SUBSTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL CALLS.

(BEGIN UNDERLINE) FOREIGN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE (END UNDERLINE)

2. GEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETING WITH SENTARO KOSAKA, FORMERR FONMIN, LDP (END UNDERLINE) (YATORN, GILMAN, MINETA, SOLARZ) --- KOSAKA OPENED COVERSAION WITH REPORT THAT DURING LUNCH WITH LDP LEADERS, PM MIKI EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE WAS VERY HAPPY WITH INFORMALITY DURING VISIT AND SAID COMMUNICATION WITH PRES FORD WAS VERY GOOD. MIKI FELT THAT A CLOSENESS AKIN TO US-UK TIES CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS DURING HIS VISIT. IN PAST, FEELING WAS STRONG AMONG JAPANESE THAT THE US FORCED JAPAN TO SHARE DEFENSE BURDENS AND TO UNDERTAKE AID TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THERE WAS NO SUCH FEELING OR PRESSURES DURING MIKI'S RECENT VISIT. JAPAN'S BASIC FOREIGN POLICY IS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE US BUT BECAUSE OF THE ASIAN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH JAPAN IS SITUATED AND BECAUSE OF JAPAN'S LACK OF NATURAL RESOURCES, JAPAN MUST PURSUE "PEACE DIPLOMACY", WHICH MEANS THAT AT TIMES THERE WILL BE SLIGHT DIVERGENCES IN US AND JAPAN'S POLICIES.

3. KOSAKA STRONGLY URGED THE US TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO RESTRAIN NK. HE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THERE IS A CURRENT DANGER OF ATTACK AGAINST SK BY NK, BUT SAID THIS JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON CONTINUED PRESENCE OF "US AND UN TROOPS" IN SK. SHOULD US TROOPS BE REMOVED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDIT CONSEQUENCES. IN RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION BY SOLARZ OF A JOINT US-USSR-PRC AGREEMENT NOT TO RESUPPLY ROK AND NK  
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IN EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, KOSAKA RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH USSR, PRC, NOR US WANTS HOSTILITIES IN KOREAS, BECAUSE OF RIVALRY BETWEEN CHINA DN RUSSIA, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DEVISE CONCERTED GREAT POWER ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE KOREAS.

4. MINETA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT CONTINUING ANTAGONISM BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ROK, NOTING THAT EVEN AFTER FONMIN MIYAZAWA VISITED SEOUL TO RE-NORMALIZE RELATIONS, DIETMAN UTSUNOMIYA WENT TO PYONGYANG, A SEEEMINGLY DELIBERATE AFFRONT TO THE ROK. ROK PM KIM JONG-PIL, MINETA SAID, WAS VERY CRITICAL OF UTSUNOMIYA'S MISSION. AGREEING THAT THE UTSUNOMIYA VISIT HAS BEEN DISTASTEFL TO ROK, KOSAKA

SAID PM MIKI WAS PERHAPS SLIGHTLY MISGUIDED BUT PM HOPED TO HAVE SOME INFORMATION FOR WASHINGTON ABOUT NK WITH WHICH THE US HAS NO CONTACT.

5. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT REACTION IN JAPAN WOULD BE IF NK ATTACKED SK AND THE US REFUSED TO DEFEND THE ROK. KOSAKA SAID SUCH A SCENARIO WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR JAPAN. ACCORDING TO KOSAKA JAPAN CAN ENJOY PROSPERITY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A QUASI DEMOCRACY NEXT DOOR. IF NK ATTACKED, RESULTING IN A DENOUEMENT IN SK LIKE THAT WHICH TRANSPIRED IN SVN, THE EFFECT IN JAPAN WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS.

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ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /024 W

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P R 220800Z AUG 75  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2703  
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USLO PEKING  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII  
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AFB JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 TOKYO 11748

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

6. GILMAN NOTED INCREASED FORCE OF NATIONALISM IN INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES AND THE TENDENCY TO CUT THE UMBILICAL CORD TO US. KOSAKA ACKNOWLEDGED SUCH A TREND AND ADDED THAT THE SAME WAS SAID BY THAIS AND PHILS OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. NEVERTHELESS, HE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THIS TREND WOULD CONTINUE IN LONG RUN. SE ASIAN ECONOMIES NEED ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGY WHICH ONLY JAPAN AND US CAN PROVIDE. THEY ALSO NEED JAPANESE AND US MARKETS. SOVS AND CHINESE WERE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS OF SE ASIANS.

7. (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETING WITH SHISAKU HOGEN, HEAD OF JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (END UNDERLINE) (YATRON, GILMAN, MINETA, SOLARZ) --- FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF FUNCTION OF JCIA AND DIFFICULTIES JAPAN HAS IN ATTAINING UN AID TARGET OF .7 PERCENT OF GNP, CONGRESSMEN QUESTIONED HOGEN ABOUT JAPAN'S SECURITY INTERESTS IN ROK. HOGEN EXPRESSED DOUBT NK WOULD ATTACK, CITING AS REASONS:  
A) RIVALRY BETWEEN NORTH KOREAS MAIN SUPPORTERS

WHICH PRECLUDED MONOLITHIC BACKING FOR PYONGYANG; B) CHINA'S DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE US; AND C) 400,000 TROOPS IN SK. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT US TROOPS COULD NOT STAY IN SK FOREVER, HE SAID IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO REMOVE THEM UNTIL A SERIOUS DIALOGUE  
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WAS RESUMED BETWEEN NK AND SK AND ANIMOSITY REDUCED. MEMBERSHIP BY BOTH KOREAS IN THE UN WOULD BE A GOOD WAY TO FOSTER SUCH DIALOGUE. HOGEN ADVISED CONGRESSMEN NOT TO PAY GREAT HEED TO DEBATE IN DIET ABOUT USE OF BASES IN JAPAN BY US IN THE EVENT OF OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREAS. HE SAID CONFIDENTLY, "THE GOJ WOULD SUPPORT US EFFORTS".

8. ON DETENTE, HOGEN SAID THERE WERE OBVIOUS CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN MOUNTING DEFENSE BUDGETS AND PROFESSIONS OF PROGRESS IN DETENTE. HE NOTED THAT THE USSR SPENDS PERHAPS 40-50 PERCENT OF ITS BUDGET ON ARMS AND THE US HAS ALLOCATED A RECORD \$94 BILLION IN CURRENT FY. MASSIVE BUDGETS ON PART OF ONE SUPERPOWER LEAD THE OTHER TO INCREASE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. HOGEN COMMENTED THAT DANGERS ARE FURTHER HEIGHTENED BECAUSE THE USSR IS A MESSIANISTIC POWER.

9. DISCUSSING ENERGY, HOGEN SAID THAT EARLIER CONCERN ABOUT RECYCLING PETRO-DOLLARS HAD BEEN MISFOUNDED. OIL COUNTRIES THEMSELVES REALIZED THE NECESSITY FOR RECYCLING OIL DOLLARS BECAUSE OF THEIR DEPENDENCY FOR TECHNOLOGY ON THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES. RESULT DEMONSTRATED NECESSITY FOR BOTH SIDES TO COOPERATE.

10. (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETING WITH TAMIO KAWAKAMI, JSP INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUREAU (END UNDERLINE)(SOLARZ, GILMAN) --- SOLARZ BEGAN DISCUSSION ASKING IF KAWAKAMI AGREED WITH PM MIKI THAT ROK'S SECURITY WAS ESSENTIAL TO JAPAN'S. KAWAKAMI NOTED THAT OPPOSITION PARTIES DO NOT SHARE GOJ'S VIEWS ON "ROK CLAUSE". GOJ SUPPORTS ROK AS PART OF ANTI-COMMUNIST REFLEX AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTES TO CONFUSING SITUATION IN ASIA. DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA ARE RESULT OF TRENDS WHICH BEGAN WITH SUCCESS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTION IN 1949. COLLAPSE OF SAIGON GOVERNMENT PERHAPS CONCLUDES THIS TREND WHICH CAN BE DESCRIBED AS THE DESIRE OF ASIAN PEOPLES' TO HAVE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS, WHETHER COMMUNIST OR NOT.

1. US EFFORTS TO CREATE A BUFFER ZONE HAVE ALSO FAILED. US ATTEMPTED TO CREATE REGIMES ON WESTERN DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MODEL. SK IS THE LAST REMAINING  
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ELEMENT OF US EFFORTS. THERE ARE DEMOCRATIC TENDENCY

IN SK -- THE OPPOSITION TO THE PAK REGIME. BUT EQUATING THE ROK'S SECURITY WITH OUR OWN, KAWAKAMI SAID, NIPS DEMOCRATIC IMPLUSES IN THE BUD. US AND JAPAN SHOULD DEVELOP POLICIES WHICH CAN COEXIST WITH TRENDS IN ASIA RAHTER THAN TRYING TO RESIST THROUGH SUPPORT OF SUCH REGIMES AS THIEU'S, LON NOL'S, AND PAK'S.

12. ASKED BY SOLARZ WHETHER US SHOULD WITHDRAW FORCES FROM ROK AND ABROGATE THE US-ROK DEFENSE AGREEMENTS IF NK ATTACKS, KAWAKAMI SAID THE JSP BELIEVES THE BEST APPROACH IS FOR BOTH KOREAS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE THEMSELVES WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. US FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SK BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHEN. IF US MOVES IN DIRECTION OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS, THIS WILL HELP CREATE ENVIRONMENT WHERE PEACEFUL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE.

13 SOLARZ SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION PRC PRIVATELY WOULD PREFER THAT US TROOPS REMAIN IN SK TO DETER KIM IL-SUNG FROM ATTACKING SK. KAWAKAMI RESPONDED THAT SOCIALISTS HAD SAME IMPRESSION REGARDING PEKING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US-JAPAN MST. PEKING'S ATTITUDE SEEMED TO BE BASED ON CONCERNS ABOUT BROADER INTERNATIONAL POLITICS -- IN THE CASE OF THE US-JAPAN MST, TO CHECK SOVIET EXPANSION, AND IN KOREAS TO PREVENT PAK FROM ADVANCING INTO NK AS WELL AS TO KEEP KIM FROM ATTACKING SK. KAWAKAMI URGED THE US TO JOIN WITH THE PRC AND USSR TO TRY TO CREATE CONDITIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA TO HELP BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE PENINSULA.

14. DISCUSSING THE MST, KAWAKAMI COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS THE MST IS NO LONGER ESSENTIAL TO EITHER JAPAN OR THE US. MST HAS BEEN ANTAGONISTIC TO PEOPLES OF ASIA AND WAS DIRECTED PARTICULARLY AT CHINA. NOW THAT BOTH JAPAN AND US WANT CLOSER TIES WITH CHINA, THE MST IS EMASCULATED. TREATY IS LOSING ITS SIGNIFICANCE. JSP FAVORS GOOD RELATIONS WITH US BUT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL, NOT MILITARY.

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ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /024 W  
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P R 220800Z AUG 75  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2704  
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USLO PEKING  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII  
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AFB JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 TOKYO 11748

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

15. (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETING WITH TOSHIO KIMURA, FORMER FONMIN, LDP (END UNDERLINE)(WOLFF, GILMAN, GUYER, MARTENS) --- WOLFF OPENED DISCUSSION WITH REMARKS ON INCREASING ORLE OF US CONGRESS IN FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY AS RESULT, HIS SUBCOMMITTEE WISHED TO CONSULT WITH ASIAN LEADERS TO DETERMINE COURSE WE SHOULD FOLLOW FOR LONGER FIVE-TEN YEAR POLICIES INSTEAD OF OPERATING FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS.

16. KIMURA RESPONDED, REPORTING THAT PM MIKI WAS VERY HAPPY WITH HIS MEETINGS AND WARM WELCOME IN WASHINGTON. DISCUSSING HISTORY OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS, HE NOTED THAT REVERSION OF OKINAWA HAD REMOVED MAJOR BARRIER BETWEEN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES. LATER, TRADE IMBALANCES WHICH HAD THREATENED WARM RELATIONS, HAD BEEN OVERCOME. HE HAD BEEN ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AT TIME NIXON DEALT TWO SHOCKS TO JAPAN BUT AFTERMATH OF THOSE SHOCKS HAS BEEN OVERCOME. ONE SIDE EFFECT OF THOSE SHOCKS, HOWEVER, IS SUSPICION STILL HARBORED IN JAPAN THAT US WILL ADMINISTER ANOTHER SHOCK BY ESTABLISHING TIES WITH NK.

17. KIMURA STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES GOJ HAD WITH OPPOSITION  
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PARTIES ON FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY REGARDING SECURITY TIES WITH THE US. BOTH WOLFF AND KIMURA HEARTILY AGREED THAT CONSULTATION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOJ AND USG WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE. KIMURA STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION IN BROADER CONTEXT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS FOOD, ENERGY, NEW ECONOMIC ORDER. PAUCITY OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN JAPAN MIGHT LEAD TO SOME MINOR DIVERGENCIES BUT BASIC OBJECTIVES WERE SHARED BY US AND JAPAN.

18. WOLFF RESPONDED THAT JOINT INTEREST IN SECURITY WAS NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY HARDWARE BUT ALSO DEPENDED ON ECONOMIC STABILITY. WE SHOULD NOT, WOLFF SAID, PERMIT OUR GOVERNMENTS TO SUBMIT TO TERRORISM WHETHER IT TOOK FORM OF HIJACKING OR ECONOMIC STRANGULATION TACTICS. DURING DISCUSSION OF ME, WOLFF COMMENTED THAT PROBLEMS IN ME ARE OUTGROWTH OF SOVIETS TRYING TO USE CLIENT STATES.

19. IN CLOSING, KIMURA NOTED THAT HE WOULD LEAD GOJ DELEGATION TO UN SPECIAL 7TH SESSION AND AGREED WITH CODEL

THAT THEIR DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN THE US.

(BEING UNDERLINE) DEFENSE TASK FORCE (END UNDERLINE)

20. MEETING WITH JDA VICE MINISTER TAKUYA KUBO AND DEFENSE BUREAU DIRECTOR-GENERAL KO MARUYAMA (BADILLO, MINETA AND SOLARZ) --- INITIAL QUESTIONS FROM THE CONGRESSMEN CONCERNED THE THREAT WHICH WOULD BE POSED TO JAPAN'S SECURITY BY A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF ALL OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE CONGRESSMEN PROBED INSISTENTLY CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC THREAT WHICH THE JAPANESE WOULD FEEL FROM A UNITED COMMUNIST KOREA IF THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET WERE STILL PATROLLING THE KOREAN STRAITS AND THE JAPAN SEA. MARUYAMA NOTED THAT THE ONLY DIRECT NORTH KOREAN MILITARY THREAT TO JAPAN WAS POSED BY ITS ILYUSHIN BOMBERS WHICH COULD NOT NOW REACH MUCH FARTHER THAN KITAKYUSHU CITY IN NORTHERN KYUSHU. IF SOUTH KOREAN TERRITORY WERE ADDED TO THE NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITY, THEN THE BOMBERS WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH THE OSAKA AREA. MR. KUBO OBSERVED THAT GOJ THREAT ASSESSMENTS ARE GENERALLY LIMITED TO THE THREAT FROM THE USSR. DEFENSE BUREAU DIRECTOR-GENERAL MARUYAMA'S ANALYSIS HAD PROPERLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ONLY MILITARY COAPABILITIES. CONFIDENTIAL

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NATURALLY, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO ASSESS THE THREAT DESCRIBED BY THE CONGRESSMEN FROM THE STAND-POINT OF KOREAN POLITICAL INTENTIONS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE GOJ DOUBTED THE KOREANS WOULD ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS INTENTION OF LAUNCHING A MAJOR ATTACK AGAINST JAPAN, EVEN IF THE PENINSULA WERE UNIFIED UNDER COMMUNISM AND RELATIONS BETWEEN TYZPTWO GOVERNMENTS WERE NOT GOOD. NEVERTHELESS, A UNIFIED KOREA UNDER THE AEGIS OF A HOSTILE COMMUNIST REGIME WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR JAPAN AND ONE COULD THEREFORE SPEAK OF "THREAT" IN PSYCHOLOGICAL/POLITICAL TERMS. KUBO WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE U.S. PRESENCE IN KOREA AS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR JAPAN IN VIEW OF THIS PSYCHO-POLITICAL THREAT. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DID NOT ASSESS THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES AS BEING ABLE TO STAND UP FOR LONG AGAINST A DETERMINED NORTH KOREAN ATTACK. THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT WAS BRITTLE, WHILE ITS POLITICAL CONSENSUS WAS FRAGILE AND LACKING IN THE STAYING POWER REQUIRED BY A MAJOR CHALLENGE FROM THE NORTH. KUBO SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED U.S. GROUND TROOPS IN HIS ANALYSIS AS BEING ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR A SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE TO A MAJOR NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA. U.S. AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT ALONE WOULD NOT SUFFICE. ON THE OTHER HAND, U.S. AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT PROBABLY WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR A CONTINGENCY SHORT OF A MAJOR GROUND ATTACK. CONGRESSMAN BADILLO CONTINUED TO PURSUE THE QUESTIOKENND AZCED WHAT WOULD BE THE REACTION IF THE U.S. WITHDREW ITS GROUND TROOPS AND LIMITED ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN A KOREAN CONTINGENCY TO AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT WHICH IF FACT DID PROVE TO BE

INSUFFICIENT AND THE U.S. THEREFORE FOUND ITSELF FORCED TO EMPLOY  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. KUBO REPLIED THAT WHILE THAT MIGHT APPEAR  
TO BE A MILITARILY FTHFSITL  
QGGDAQKWD (#)  
COULD HAVE DISASTROUS  
CONSEQUENCES THROUGHOUT ASIA.

21. CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ PURSUED KUBO ON THE QUESTION OF  
UNRESTRAINED USE OF U.S. BASES IN JAPAN FOR A KOREAN CONTINGENCY  
AND WHETHER OR NOT THE GOJ WOULD RESPOND "YES" IF ASKED FOR  
DIRECT COMBAT DEPLOYMENT FROM USFJ BASES IN PRIOR  
CONSULTATIONS IF SOUTH KOREA WERE INVADED. KUBO RESPONDED  
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THAT HE FELT  
THE ANSWER MOST PROBABLY WOULD BE "YES" IN  
THE CASE OF SERIOUS, UNAMBIGUOUS LARGE-SCALE AGGRESSION.  
IN UNCLEAR, SMALLER CONTINGENCIES SUCH AS SUBVERSIION, A  
YES ANSWER WOULD BE POLITICALLY MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOJ.

NOTE BY OC/T: TOKYO 11748/3. (#)AS RECEIVED.  
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /024 W  
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P R 220800Z AUG 75  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2705  
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USLO PEKING  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII  
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AFB JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 4 TOKYO 11748

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

22. (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETING WITH USFJ STAFF AND EMBASSY POL/MIL  
OFFICERS (END UNDERLINE (SOLARZ)

SOLARZ ASKED HOW THE DENIAL TO U.S. FORCES OF JAPANESE  
BASES WOULD AFFECT RESUPPLY OPERATIONS DURING A KOREAN



CONTINGENCY. THE USFJ STAFF POINTED OUT THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE RESUPPLY ROUTES TO SOUTH KOREA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE JAPAN WOULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED AIR DELIVERY CAPABILITY. SOLARZ RESPONDED WITH HIS IMPRESSION THAT WHILE THE BASES IN JAPAN WERE VERY USEFUL IN SUPPORTING KOREA, THEY COULD BE DONE WITHOUT, IF NECESSARY. THE USFJ REPRESENTATIVES REPEATED THAT IN THEIR MILITARY JUDGMENT, JAPANESE BASES WOULD BE VITAL FOR SUPPORT DURING A KOREAN CONTINGENCY. PRESENT U.S. PLANNING FOR THE WORST-CASE CONTINGENCY IN KOREA WOULD REQUIRE TRANSPORTATION OF A VOLUME OF MEN AND MATERIAL WHICH COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME PERIODS WITHOUT ACCESS TO JAPANESE BASES. CONG SOLARZ RESPONDED THAT IF PRESENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING ENVISIONED THE DISPATCH OF MORE U.S. GROUND TROOPS TO KOREA, THAT WOULD PROVE TO BE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. SOLARZ ALSO ASKED THE GROUP FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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THEIR IDEAS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF U.S. BASES IN JAPAN FOR USE IN SUPPORTING THE ROK. HE WAS TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT OF DIRECT, LARGE-SCALE ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA, THE GOJ WOULD PROBABLY RESPOND FAVORABLY.

23. SOLARZ ALSO ASKED WHETHER, IF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WERE DISSOLVED, THE THREAT TO JAPAN OF DIRECT ATTACK FROM THE USSR OR ELSEWHERE WOULD BE INCREASED. HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE EASILY ANY SUCH DIRECT ATTACK, BUT JAPAN WOULD CERTAINLY FEEL MUCH MORE THREATENED IN NOT ONLY MILITARY, BUT IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS AS WELL. JAPANESE REACTION TO SUCH PERCEIVED THREATS, IF EXTENDED TO MASSIVE -- POSSIBLY NUCLEAR -- REARMAMENT, WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD BE A GREAT FACTOR OF INSTABILITY IN THE PACIFIC REGION.

(BEGIN UNDERLINE) ECONOMIC TASK FORCE (END UNDERLINE)

24. BEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETINGS WITH FONOFF DIRGEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION BUREAU KIKUCHI, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU DEP DIRGEN NOMURA, ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY AND MITI OFFICIALS (SIMON, CLANCY). END UNDERLINE) DURING CALLS AT FONOFF, EPA, AND MITI, JAPANESE OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED ENERGY AND RAW MATERIAL IMPORT NEEDS AND THEIR STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS; JAPANESE ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES; PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY; AND JAPANESE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE POLICES.

25. CALL ON FONOFF ECONOMIC BUREAU DEP DIRGEN WAS PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL. MR. NOMURA REVIEWED JAPAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND RECENT HISTORY, NOTING THAT THE COUNTRY IS HOPEFULLY PULLING OUT OF ITS LONGEST AND DEEPEST RECESSION SINCE THE WAR, FOLLOWING MORE THAN 20 YEARS OF EXTREMELY RAPID GROWTH.

REGARDING MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, NOMURA SAID THAT JAPAN HAS AS ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE IN THE TRADE TALKS A SUBSTANTIAL ACROSS THE BOARD LOWERING OF TARIFF RATES AS WELL AS SOME PROGRESS IN REDUCING OR ELIMINATING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. HE SAID JAPAN FAVORS A TARIFF REDUCTION FORMULA OF MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SIMPLICITY. HE NOTED A DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. ON THE DESIRABILITY OF AN  
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"EARLY HARVEST" OR A "MINI-PACKAGE" FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. GOJ WAS CONCERNED THAT ATTEMPTS TO REACH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT MIGHT BE FRUITLESS.

(BEGIN UNDERLINE) AGRICULTURE TASK FORCE (END UNDERLINE)  
26. (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MEETINGS WITH AGRICULTURE VICEMIN NAKANO, AGMINISTRY FOOD AGENCY DIRGEN MIYOSHI, AND INT AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRGEN TAKASU (YERS, DE LA GARZA).(END UNDERLINE) DURING CALLS, CONGRES- SMEN STRESSED RELIABILITY OF U.S. AS A SUPPLIER OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN OF THE U.S. MARKET. CONGRESSMAN DE LA GARZA AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF CITRUS GROWING AREAS, EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE TO U.S. OF EXPORTS OF CITRUS TO JAPAN.

27. COMMENT: DISCUSSIONS WERE LIVELY AND CANDID. WE BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH MOST JAPANESE SIGNIFIED IMPORTANCE JAPAN ATTACHES TO SECURITY OF ROK, CODEL PERCEIVED THAT EMPHASIS IS SHIFTING GRADUALLY IN JAPAN TO MORE ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE TOWARD NK AND TO DESIRE FOR RESTORED DIALOGUE TO EASE TENSIONS AND PERMIT NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH ENTIRE KOREAN PENINSULA.  
HODGSON

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** COLLECTIVE SECURITY, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, CODELS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <28 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <29 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
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**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**To:** STATE INFO JAKARTA  
MANILA  
SEOUL  
HONG KONG  
PEKING  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AFB JAPAN

**Type:** TE

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